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UPJOHN CO. v. UNITED STATES AS SUPPORT
FOR SELECTIVE WAIVER OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
CORPORATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Abstract: In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. u United States
clarified the application of the attorney-client privilege to corporations and
recognized three concerns in deciding whether such a privilege applies: the
predictability as to which communications will be disclosed to third parties,
the promotion of the free flow of information between clients and attor-
neys, and the encouragement of corporate self-policing and cooperation
with investigations. Recently, however, a new debate over the attorney-client
privilege has arisen in the corporate context—whether to recognize a selec-
tive waiver of the attorney-client privilege where communications have been
disclosed already to one government agency but not to civil litigants or
other government agencies. This debate has engendered conflicting re-
sponses from federal circuit courts, the U.S. Department of justice, the Ad-
visory Committee on Federal Evidence Rules, and Congress. This Note ar-
gues that by adhering to the principles laid out in Upjohn, courts, lawmak-
ers, and rulemakers should resolve the conflict in favor of recognizing a
selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1981 landmark case of Upjohn Co. v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court confirmed and clarified the application of the attorney-
client privilege to corporations.' In so doing, the Court resolved a sig-
nificant conflict among the lower courts in favor of a practical and flexi-
ble approach to deciding which corporate communications should be
disclosed. 2 The Court's rationale in Upjohn reflected several concerns
that remain relevant for corporate attorneys, including the ability to
predict which communications the attorney-client privilege protects, the
need for protection of information flowing from clients to attorneys, the
balance of competing incentives in the context of internal investiga-
tions, and utility.3
I See 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
2 See id. at 396.
See id. at 390-93.
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More recently, another conflict regarding how the attorney-client
privilege applies to corporations has arisen in the lower courts. 4 Spe-
cifically, the debate centers on the effect of waiving the privilege in cor-
porate criminal investigations when the government requests a waiver
of privilege from a corporation. 5
 In addition to a split involving seven
circuit courts, influential organizations including the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, the Department of Justice (the "DOJ"), the Advisory
Committee on Federal Evidence Rules, and even Congress are all cur-
rently playing a role in articulating the best approach to waiver of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. 6
The DOJ, for instance, has consistently upheld the right of fed-
eral prosecutors to request that corporations waive the attorney-client
privilege in corporate criminal investigations.? Although the DOJ has
recently cut back on prosecutor? freedom to request privilege waiv-
ers, prosecutors are permitted in some cases to consider willingness to
waive the privilege in evaluating cooperation and in making charging
decisions. 8
 Because the U.S. Sentencing Commission's current Organ-
izational Sentencing Guidelines (the "Sentencing Guidelines" or the
"Guidelines") reward cooperation with the government in the form of
drastically reduced fines for culpable corporations, those corporations
that are subject to governmental investigation are often left with little
choice but to waive the attorney-client privilege upon the govern-
4 See, e.g., In re Qwest C.ommc'tis Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. de-
nkd, 127 S. CL 584 (2006); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 302-03 (6th Cir.
2002); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir.
1991); Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Gin 1977) (en ham:).
5 See, e.g., Columbia, 293 F.3d at 302-03; United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d
681, 686 {1st Cir. 1997); Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
6 See Quest, 450 F.3d at 1186-88 (discussing the current circuit split); Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) ; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL, ch. 8, introductory ant. (2006); Memorandum from Honorable Jerry E.
Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Stand-
ing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 15, 2006, rev. June 30, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter Advisory Committee Memorandum], available ca fittp://www.tiscourts.gov/rules/Ex-
cerpt_EV
 Report Pub.pdf; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep't Compo-
nents and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], available at
littp://www.usdoj.gov/clag/speech/2006/mcnulty_merno.pdf.
7 See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § VII; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson
to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys ( Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson
Memorandum], available at http://wm+husdoj.gov/dag/crtf/corporate_guidelines.litm;
Memorandum from Eric Holder to Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999)
[hereinafter Holder Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.govicriminal/firaud/policy/
Chargingcorps.html.
t' See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § VII.
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ment's request.9 This creates serious problems, because waiver of the
privilege as to any government agency can result in waiver of the privi-
lege as to other government agencies and all civil litigants. 19
The federal courts of appeals, on the other hand, are currently
divided on the effect of a privilege waiver as to the government." The
Eighth Circuit has chosen to recognize a "selective" waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege, whereby a corporation's waiver of the privilege as
to the government does not necessarily result in waiver of the privilege
as to nongovernmental parties such as civil litigants. 12 Other circuits
that have considered the issue, including the First, Second, Third,
Sixth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits, have rejected the doc-
trine of selective waiver and instead hold that waiver of the privilege as
to the government constitutes waiver as to all parties, including civil
litigants. 15 Accordingly, attorneys and corporations are faced with seri-
ous concerns, including the harsh consequences of waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege and the importance, even necessity, of cooperation
with the government." The concerns of predictability, preservation of
the investigatory role of the corporate attorney, and practicality that the
Supreme Court recognized in Upjohn are also concerns for corporate
attorneys dealing with the current circuit conflict. 15
9 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8; Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges:
Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Mis-
guided), 48 Vu,t.. L. REV. 469, 538 (2003) (observing that the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines exert "substantial pressure" on corporations to cooperate with the govern-
ment); John Hasnas, Overcriminaliration: The Politics of Crime: Ethics and the Problem of White
Collar Crime, 54 Am. U. L. REV. 579, 620-21 (2005) (arguing that the Organizational Sen-
tencing Guidelines provide an "almost irresistible incentive" for corporations to cooperate
with the government).
10 See Qwest, 450 F.3(1 at 1192; Columbia, 293 F.3(1 at 302-03; In re Steinhardt Partners,
L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2c1 Cir. 1993); see also Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686; Permian
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In In re Qwest Communications
International, Inc., In re Columbia/IICA Healthcare, and In re Steinhardt Partners, disclosure as
to the government resulted in disclosure as to civil litigants. Quest, 450 F.3d at 1192; Colum-
bia, 293 F.3(1 at 302-03; Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236. United States it Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Permian Corp. v. United States presented slightly different Factual situations,
where disclosure as to one government agency resulted in disclosure as to other govern-
ment agencies. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220.
11 See, e.g., Quest, 450 F.3d at 1192; Columbia, 293 F.3d at 302-03; Diversified, 572 F.2d at
611
12 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
13 Quest, 450 F.3d at 1192; Columbia, 293 F.3d at 302-03; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at
686; Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220.
14 See Cole, supra note 9, at 538; Hasnas, supra note 9, at 620-21; see also infra notes
170-225 and accompanying text (discussing why cooperation can be considered a neces-
sity) .
15 See infra notes 226-285 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Note describes the lower court conflict that led to the
Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn and analyzes the Upjohn holding. 18
Part II examines various circuit court approaches to selective waiver
and discusses proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502(c), which would
resolve the current circuit court conflict. 17
 Part III demonstrates the
significance of the current debate over selective waiver of the attorney-
client privilege by exploring the Sentencing Guidelines, current DOJ
policy, and the proposed Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of
2007. 18
 Part N proposes that if courts seek to adhere to the same prin-
ciples that were validated in the Upjohn decision, they should resolve
this conflict in favor of the Eighth Circuit and recognize selective waiver
of the attorney-client privilege.'9
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S VISION OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN UPJOHN CO. V. UNITED STATES
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict
in the lower courts regarding which test should be employed to deter-
mine whether the attorney-client privilege protects corporate communi-
cations. 2° In examining what types of corporate communications deserve
such protection, the Court necessarily made several policy judgments
about the attorney-client privilege. 2 ' Specifically, the Court sought to in-
crease predictability, protect the attorney's fact-gathering role, and eliminate
a significant disincentive for corporate sell-policing.22
A. Two Approaches to the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
Prior to Upjohn, lower federal courts approached the extent of the
attorney-client privilege for corporate communications in two different
ways. 25
 Several circuit courts employed a "control group" test, which
privileged only those communications between an attorney and a mem-
ber of the corporation's "control group" of executives—those who are
entitled to participate in decisions regarding the corporation's legal
16 See infra notes 20-53 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 54-169 and accompanying text.
is See infra notes 170-225 and accompanying text
19 See infra notes 226-285 and accompanying text.
2°
 449 U.S. 383,394-95 (1981).
21 Id.
22 See id. at 390-93.
29 See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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matters." Other lower courts used a test called the "subject matter" or
"Harper & Row" test. Under this test, communication was privileged if:
(1) it was between an attorney and an employee of the corporation,
(2) the employee's supervisors directed the employee to make the
communication, and (3) the subject matter of the communication dealt
with the employee's duties in the context of his employment.26
B. Resolution in Upjohn
The Upjohn Court resolved the conflict between these two ap-
proaches by applying a version of the Harper & Row subject matter
test.27 In Upjohn, the Upjohn Company performed an internal investi-
gation into allegations of illegal payments to foreign governments. 28 As
part of the investigation, the corporation's employees completed ques-
tionnaires prepared by Upjohn's in-house counsel and submitted them
to upper management in a highly confidential manner. 29 When the In-
ternal Revenue Service began to investigate the illegal payments, it re-
quested the questionnaires and other documents.30 The ensuing dis-
pute concerned whether the attorney-client privilege protected the
questionnaires and related documents.31
The Upjohn Court held that the attorney-client privilege protected
the communications in question because they were made to corporate
counsel (1) by the corporation's employees, (2) concerning matters
within the scope of the employee's duties, and (3) with the employees'
awareness that they were being questioned so that the corporation
could obtain legal advice. 32 The Court declined to lay out a compre-
hensive test, stressing the importance of case-by-case decisions on privi-
24 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Stipp. 483, 485 (ED. Pa.
1962). The court in City of Philadelphia was the first to establish the control group test, rea-
soning that an employee only sufficiently personifies the corporation such that he can be
considered a "client" if he has the authority to make or contribute to making a decision
about whether or how to follow an attorney's advice. Id.
23 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970), affd
per curiam, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
26 Id. at 491-92; see also Michael L Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Rivi-
lege in the Corporate Context, 28 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 473, 484-87 (1987) (discussing pre-
Upjohn variations of the subject matter test).
27 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
23 Id. at 386.
29 Id, at 387.
3° Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 388.
32 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 399-95.
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lege issues." Unlike the more narrowly applicable control group test,
this new approach broadened the attorney-client privilege by extending
protection of the privilege to communications between attorneys and
lower-level corporate employees. 34
C. The Resolution's Response to Problems Facing Corporate Attorneys
The Supreme Court's rationale in Upjohn addressed and validated
three central problems facing attorneys who counsel corporations: pre-
dictability, protection not only of lawyers' advice but also of information
given to the lawyer, and the competing incentives of corporations in
conducting internal investigations."
First, the Court in Upjohn recognized the importance of preserv-
ing predictability, a clear concern for both attorneys and clients and a
factor that shapes how attorneys and clients choose to communicate
with one another. 36 The Court went so far as to state that lain uncer-
tain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privi-
lege at all."37 More recently, the Court reaffirmed the need for cer-
tainty in privilege determinations by quoting Upjohn in the 1996 case
of Jaffee v. Redmond, where the Court first recognized a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege." By placing such a premium on predictability,
the Court demonstrated that certainty, and the efficiency that results
from certainty, is an important factor to be considered when deter-
mining the scope of the attorney-client privilege."
The Court also acknowledged in Upjohn that the attorney-client
privilege protects not only the advice that corporate counsel gives to
the corporation, but also the information that flows from corporate
employees to corporate counsel. 40 This acknowledgment and the eradi-
cation of the control group test in general reflect the Court's decision
to privilege not only communications between attorneys and execu-
33
 Id. at 396.
31 Id. at 395.
35 See id. at 390-95.
38 See id. at 393.
57
 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
38 SecJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
" See id. Contra Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 fiorsTRA L. Rev. 897, 933 (2006) (not-
ing that although the Court "touted the need for predictability," uncertainty remained
after the Upjohn decision); Waldman, supra note 26, at 497-99 (critiquing the fact that the
Court desired certainty in Upjohn but declined to create a new comprehensive test).
48 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
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Lives, but also communications between attorneys and lower-level em-
ployees of a corporation." Thus, the Court in Upjohn explicitly at-
tempted to encourage, rather than discourage, communication be-
tween employees and lawyers. 42
Similarly, the Upjohn decision reflected the Court's recognition of
conflicting incentives for attorneys participating in internal investiga-
tions and a willingness to shape application of the attorney-client privi-
lege to encourage corporate self-policing. 43 Before Upjohn, attorneys
had to choose between interviewing lower-level employees (and risking
that the information would be exposed because the communication
lacked the protection of the attorney-client privilege), and not conduct-
ing interviews with lower-level employees (thus risking that possible
wrongdoing would remain uncovered)." This created conflicting in-
centives for attorneys. 45 On the one hand, the attorney has an incentive
to promote compliance with the law, and communications with lower-
level employees are essential to maintaining compliance. 46 On the
other hand, the attorney also seeks to avoid exposing the corporation
to liability, so there is an incentive not to interview lower-level employ-
ees at all, because the attorney-client privilege may not protect these
communications and may expose the corporation to liability if dis-
closed.47 By resolving the conflict in favor of encouraging corporate
self-policing and internal investigations, the Upjohn Court demon-
strated a utilitarian approach to the attorney-client privilege. 48 Specifi-
cally, the Court recognized that judicial interpretation of the attorney-
client privilege can serve to promote incentives favoring frank commu-
nication and voluntary compliance with the law. 49
41 See id. at 391-92.
42 See id. at 392.
4-1 See id.
44 M. at 391-92.
4.R
	 449 U.S. at 391-92.
46 Id.
47 Id.
49 See id.; see also Waldman, supra note 26, at 482 n.39 (citing the Upjohn case as an ex-
ample of reliance on utilitarian justifications); Jeanne Andrea Di Grazio, Note, The Calculus
of Confidentiality: Ethical and Legal Approaches to the Labyrinth of Corporate Attorney-Client Com-
munications via E-mail and the Internet—From Upjohn Co. v. United States and Its Progeny to
the Hand Calculus Revisited and Revised, 23 J. CORP. L. 553, 570 (1998) (stating that
the Upjohn holding can be interpreted as a functionalist approach, because the Court's
holding went beyond the rules of case precedent").
49 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392; see also Waldman, supra note 26, at 492 (discussing the
Upjohn Court's reliance on a "voluntary compliance" model, in which free flow of commu-
nication leads to increased voluntary compliance with the law).
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D. Concerns Still Relevant Today
The three central concerns of corporate lawyers—maintaining
predictability, protection of information flowing to the attorney in in-
ternal investigations, and the pressure of competing incentives—that
were addressed in Upjohn remain relevant in the debate over selective
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 50
 Corporate lawyers frequently
engage in internal corporate investigations, but, because of the current
approach taken by the DOJ and the Sentencing Guidelines, it is often
unpredictable whether the attorney-client privilege will protect com-
munications obtained as part of such investigations. 51 The threat of
privilege waivers forces lawyers to worry about whether the information
they gather from corporate employees will remain confidential as to
private litigants. 52
 Just like the competing incentives considered in the
Upjohn case, attorneys arc faced with another difficult choice: accept
the risk that information may be disclosed and collect the information
necessary to uncover corporate wrongdoing, or avoid the risk alto-
gether by not collecting the information. 53
H. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY REGARDING SELECTIVE WAIVER
Thus far, only the Eighth Circuit has recognized the doctrine of
selective waiver, which provides that waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege as to the government in a government investigation does not
5° See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-93; see also Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Conse-
quences of the Federal Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. L. Rie.v. 111, 128 (2004) (exam-
ining the risks involved in conducting an internal investigation); David M. Zornow & Keith D.
Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investiga-
tions, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 156 (2000) (discussing the uncertainty regarding how infor-
mation from employee interviews will be treated in internal investigations).
5' See, e.g., liasnas, supra note 9, at 644; Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 50, at 153; see
also U.S. SENTENCING GUMP:LINKS MANUAL ch. 8 (2006); McNulty Memorandum, supra
note 6, VII.
52 See Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation lit Business Organizations and the Impact of
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L Rev. 587, 606 (2004) (admitting that there is no easy
solution to the litigation dilemma" that stems from third-party access to information dis-
closed to the government); Julie R. O'Sullivan, Some Thoughts on Proposed Revisions to the Or-
ganizational Guidelines, 1 OHIO ST. J. GRIM. L. 487, 503 (2004) (discussing this litigation di-
lemma"); Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 50, at 156 (recognizing that after waiver of the privi-
lege as to the government, civil plaintiffs are likely to obtain the disclosed information).
53 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 39, at 940, 944 (describing concerns that the rising preva-
lence of privilege waivers in corporate investigations will prevent attorneys from either
memorializing internal investigations in writing or completing internal investigations at
all); Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 50, at 156.
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automatically establish waiver as to civil litigants or other third parties. 54
For varying reasons, nearly all of the other circuits that have addressed
this issue have rejected the doctrine of selective waiver. 55 Recently in
April 2006, however, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules ap-
proved a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence that
would permit selective waiver. 56 If adopted, Rule 502(c) would resolve,
by rule, the current circuit split in favor of the Eighth Circuit. 57
A. The Eighth Circuit's Recognition of Selective Waiver
The Eighth Circuit first recognized the doctrine of selective waiver
of the attorney-client privilege in a 1977 en bane holding in Diversified
Industries, Inc. v. Meredith. 58 Another corporation sued Diversified Indus-
tries ("Diversified") for alleged conspiracy, interference with contrac-
tual relationships, and violations of the Clayton Antitrust Act. 59 In the
course of litigation, the plaintiff sought to obtain several documents
that Diversified's lawyers prepared during an internal corporate inves-
tigation.6° The plaintiff corporation argued that the attorney-client
privilege did not protect these documents, but that even if it did, the
privilege was waived when Diversified turned the documents over to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in response to an
54 Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane).
55 See In re Qwest Comn-tc'tis Intl Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006), eert denied,
127 S. Ct. 584 (2006); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3(1 289, 302 (6th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1426 (3d Cir. 1991); Permian Corp. v.
United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Two other circuits have confronted
the issue indirectly. See Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (7th
Cir. 1997) (addressing selective waiver in the law enforcement investigatory privilege con-
text, not the attorney-client privilege context); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619,
626 (4th Cir. 1988) (not addressing the merits of selective waiver directly, but holding that
disclosure of documents to the government did constitute waiver of the attorney-client
privilege).
SeeAdvisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 12-13.
57 Id. Proposed Rule 502 is unlikely to go into effect until late 2007, at the earliest. See
James C. Duff, Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, The Rulemaking Process: A Sum-
mary for the Bench and Bar (Apr. 2006), littp://www.uscourts,gov/rules/proceduresum.
htm. The Judicial Conference may consider the rule as early as September 2007, and, if
approved by the Judicial Committee, it would be submitted to the Supreme Court for ap-
proval. See id. If the Supreme Court adopts the rule, it will become effective either when
Congress adopts the rule, or, as a matter of law, seven months after approval by the Court.
Id.
" 572 F.2{1 at 611.
" Id. at 600.
6° Id. at 599.
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SEC subpoena in a separate proceeding. 61
 Diversified countered that
the attorney-client privilege protected the documents, despite the fact
that they had been released to the SEC. 62
A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit in Diversified applied
the "control group" test, evaluating whether the relevant communica-
tions were made between the attorneys and members of Diversified's
control group of executives having power to make decisions regarding
the company's legal relations.° Because the Supreme Court had not
yet repudiated this test in Upjohn Co. v. United States, the circuit court
panel held that the attorney-client privilege did not cover such docu-
ments because Diversified's lawyers were hired to conduct an investi-
gation and not to provide legal services or advice. 64
 Accordingly, the
court did not reach the question of selective waiver, but, in a footnote,
provided some support for the doctrine:
We would be reluctant to hold that voluntary surrender of
privileged material to a governmental agency in obedience
to an agency subpoena constitutes a waiver of the privilege
for alt purposes, including its use in subsequent private liti-
gation in which the material is sought to be used against the
party which yielded it to the agency. 65
An en banc decision of the Eighth Circuit reversed the panel, re-
jecting the control group test in favor of the subject-matter-based
Harper & Row test. 66
 Applying this test, the court held that the docu-
ments were covered by the attorney-client privilege. 67 The court went
on to hold that the disclosure of documents to the SEC in the separate
SEC proceeding constituted only a limited waiver of the privilege and
did not constitute a waiver of the privilege as to the plaintiff corpora-
tion.68
 Reflecting a desire to encourage this self-policing measure, the
court reasoned that a contrary decision would deter corporations from
conducting internal investigations. 69
61 Id.
62 Id. at 606.
63
 See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 603.
" See id. For further discussion of the control group test, see Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390
and supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
63 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 604 n.1.
66 Id. at 609.
67
 Id. at 610-11; see also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing the
Harper & Row test).
66 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
ss Id.
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The Diversified opinion foreshadowed the formal rejection of the
control group test by the Supreme Court in Upjohn, and, significantly,
language from the Eighth Circuit's Diversified opinion was directly
quoted in Upjohn." Upjohn attempted to address what the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Diversified characterized as a "Hobson's choice" for corporate
attorneys: the control group test forces attorneys to choose between
conducting interviews with employees that may not be privileged and
choosing not to interview those employees at all, thus possibly failing to
uncover legal compliance issues. 71
B. Rejection of the Selective Waiver Doctrine
1. The District of Columbia Circuit Approach
In 1981, several months after Upjohn was decided, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Permian Corp. v.
United States chose not to follow the Eighth Circuit's Diversified deci-
sion." The Permian case involved a complex factual situation but dealt
with several of the same basic principles addressed in Diversified." A
parent corporation and its subsidiary, the Permian Corporation, dis-
closed privileged documents to the SEC in order to expedite the ap-
proval of the parent corporation's registration statement, but strongly
objected when the Department of Energy sought to obtain the docu-
ments from the SEC. 74 Although the parent corporation and the SEC
had an agreement that the parent would be notified about who would
be viewing the privileged documents, the court held that there was no
agreement requiring that the documents not be shared with other
government agencies. 75
The D.C. Circuit declined to accept the Eighth Circuit's concept of
selective waiver, reasoning that the doctrine does not clearly support
the traditional principles of the attorney-client privilege and would al-
low the attorney to use selective disclosure as a tactical tool in litiga-
tion. 76 The court emphasized that the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to protect and promote communications between an attor-
76 See id.; see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96.
71 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392; Diversified, 572 F.2d at 608-09.
n Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220; see Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
73 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1219.
76 Id. at 1220.
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ney and a client." According to the D.C. Circuit, the doctrine of selec-
tive waiver does nothing to further this objective, because disclosure
has already undermined secrecy. 78
 The court also held that there was
nothing special about the SEC that allowed waiver as to that agency to
be different from waiver as to other agencies such as the Department of
Energy.79
In addition, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that a client should not
be permitted to "pick and choose among his opponents" by waiving the
privilege or asserting the privilege based solely on a determination of
whether the action will benefit the client. 80 Although the language of
the Permian opinion does not describe this point as an issue of fairness,
the rationale that clients should not be able to use their privilege solely
for tactical benefit has been characterized as the Permian "fairness ra-
tionale" in subsequent opinions. 81
 Later D.C. Circuit cases developed
this point, including In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum. 82
In a brief footnote to the Permian opinion, the D.C. Circuit rejected
the argument that the corporation's disclosure to the SEC was not truly
voluntary." Reasoning that the company's waiver as to the SEC was due
to its own desire to have a registration statement approved more quickly,
the court found that the corporation voluntarily accepted the risk that
the privileged information would be disclosed elsewhere." Thus, unlike
the Supreme Court in Upjohn or the Eighth Circuit in Diversified, the
D.C. Circuit recognized the corporation's Hobson's choice but did not
find it to be dispositive.85
2. The Third Circuit
Echoing much of the D.C. Circuit's rationale for rejecting the doc-
trine of selective waiver, the Third Circuit similarly rejected the doc-
77 Id.
78 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
" Id.
80 Id.
81
 See, e.g., Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n.13.
82 In re Subpoenas Duces Tecutn, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
voluntary disclosure of documents to the SEC resulted in waiver of the attorney-client
privilege); Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
85
 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 n.14.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 1221 n.15; see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92 (recognizing that a corporate
attorney conducting an investigation of his corporate client faces a "Hobson's choice");
Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611 (stating that allowing disclosure as to other government agen-
cies on the basis that the disclosure was voluntary would thwart internal investigations).
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trine in the 1991 case of Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Phil-
ippines. 86 The SEC was investigating Westinghouse for allegedly bribing
government officials in the Philippines, and the corporation hired a
law firm to complete an internal investigation into the matter. 87 The
law firm produced two letters summarizing the findings of the internal
investigation to the SEC, and Westinghouse justified this disclosure by
relying on the Eighth Circuit's holding in Diversified and on the SEC
confidentiality regulations.° Westinghouse also produced documents
to the DOJ in a subsequent investigation pursuant to a subpoena from
the grand jury. 88 These documents, however, were not directly at issue
in this Third Circuit proceeding.°
Although the Third Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit in rejecting the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Diversified, the court did not concur com-
pletely with the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Permian.81 The Third Circuit
agreed with the Permian court that encouraging disclosure to the gov-
ernment does not further the traditional policies supporting the attor-
ney-client privilege 92 Like the D.C. Circuit, the Westinghouse court viewed
the main rationale for recognition of the selective waiver doctrine to be
facilitating cooperation with the government, which does little to further
the true purpose of the attorney-client privilege—promoting disclosures
to the attorney for the purpose of receiving legal advice 95 The Third
Circuit, however, broke with the D.C. Circuit on the issue of the Permian
court's "fairness" rationale:34 Unlike the D.C. Circuit in Permian, the
Third Circuit held that it was not necessary to decide whether it would
be fair to the opposing party if Westinghouse were permitted to waive the
privilege just as to the government, because it is not inherently unfair to
permit disclosure to a government agency but not private litigants.95 In a
footnote, the court stated that private litigants would be "no worse oil'
than if there had been no disclosure to a governmental agency. 96 For the
Third Circuit, there was no need to rule on the fairness issue because it
84 951 F.2d at 1426.
87 Id. at 1418.
88 Id.; see Diversifted, 572 F.2d at 611. The SEC's confidentiality regulations stated that
documents obtained by the SEC in the course of an investigation are considered nonpub-
lic and will be kept confidential unless disclosure is authorized. 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-4 (1978),
89 Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1419.
9° Id.
91 Id. at 1425-26; see Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21; Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
92 Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425.
93 Id.; see Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21.
" Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425.
95 Id. at 1426.
98 Id. at 1426 n.13.
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was enough to say that the disclosures were not made for the purpose of
seeking legal advice 97
Like the Permian court, the court in Westinghouse relegated the dis-
pute about whether the claimed voluntary disclosure was truly volun-
tary to a footnote.98 The Third Circuit considered the disclosures to
both the SEC and the DOJ to be voluntary, even though the DOJ dis-
closure was pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, because Westinghouse
did not contest the subpoena to the point where a court ordered it to
produce the documents 99 This footnote reveals the Third Circuit's po-
sition that affirmative disclosure to the government is always voluntary,
and the court declined to take into account external factors including
the favorable treatment that corporations receive if they cooperate with
the governmen
3. The First Circuit
In 1997, the First Circuit similarly declined to recognize selective
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in United States v. Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technologp. 101 In connection with contracts between the federal
government and the university, the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy ("MIT") had disclosed legal billing statements and corporate min-
utes to the Deknse Contract Audit Agency, the auditing organization
within the Department of Defense. 192 When the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice sought access to the documents, the university claimed attorney-
client privilege." The court, however, held that disclosure to the audit
agency had forfeited the privilege.'"
The First Circuit's main rationale in Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology was similar to that of the other circuits in Permian and Westing-
house—denying selective waiver would not impact the main purpose
behind the attorney-client privilege, which is to promote the giving and
receiving of legal advice. 198 Unlike the Third Circuit in Westinghouse,
however, the First Circuit chose to consider the "fairness" of allowing
91 Id. at 1426.
" See id. at 1427 11.14; see also Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 n.14 (touching on the volun-
tariness issue in a footnote).
99 Westinghouse, 951 F.2c1 at 1427 n.14.
I" Id. at 1427 n.15.
ol 129 F.3d at 685-86.
' 92 Id. at 683.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 685.
105 Id.; see Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21.
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disclosure to one party but not the other, as reasoned in the D.C. Cir-
cuit's Permian decision." The First Circuit also voiced an additional
concern about the practical issues of recognizing selective waiver, not-
ing that to take the Eighth Circuit's approach would create problems of
efficiency because there would be an overall lack of certainty and a
need for line-drawing in every case."7
Like the D.C. and Third Circuits, the First Circuit in Massachusetts
Institute of Technology also rejected the argument that the organization's
waiver of the privilege was not truly voluntary." MIT argued that its
disclosure was not completely voluntary because, as a government con-
tractor, the university was required to disclose the documents to the
audit agency." The First Circuit, however, pointed out that MIT chose
to take on the role of government contractor—thus, the choice to dis-
close was considered voluntary. 110 The court stated more generally that
"[a]nyone who chooses to disclose a privileged document to a third
party, or does so pursuant to a prior agreement or understanding, has
an incentive to do so, whether for gain or to avoid disadvantage."" The
First Circuit also noted that to accept the argument that the initial dis-
closure was not truly voluntary could start the courts down a slippery
slope with "no logical terminus" in sight. 112
4. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit joined the majority of federal appellate courts in
2002 by declining to recognize selective waiver of the attorney-client
privilege in In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare.us In Columbia, a healthcare
corporation under DOJ investigation for allegations of Medicare and
Medicaid fraud had conducted several internal audits while the investi-
gation was ongoing. 114 After first refusing a DOJ request to view these
audit documents, the corporation agreed to produce some of the
" Compare Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685 (considering the fairness of disclosure as
to one party and not another), and Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-2 1 (same), with Westinghouse,
95! F.2d at 1426 (choosing not to consider the fairness issue).
1 O7 Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685; see also Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
" Mass. Inst. of l'ech., 129 F.3d at 686.
109
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 696.
" 5 Columbia, 293 F.3d at 302; see Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426; Permian, 665 F.2d
1220-21.
114 Columbia, 293 F.3d at 291-92.
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documents pursuant to a confidentiality agreement." When the cor-
poration was later sued by private litigants alleging that they were over-
billed, the corporation sought to protect the audit documents by assert-
ing the attorney-client privilege. 116
In a detailed opinion summarizing the various circuit views on the
subject, the Sixth Circuit rejected the theory of selective waiver for sev-
eral reasons. 117 Like the D.C., Third, and First Circuits, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the main policy behind the attorney-client privilege of en-
couraging disclosures between attorneys and clients is not supported by
recognizing selective waiver of the privilege." 9 The court observed that
the policy driving the Eighth Circuit's adoption of the selective waiver
doctrine was to encourage voluntary cooperation with the government,
not to encourage open communication between clients and attorneys." 9
The Sixth Circuit recognized the benefits provided by a selective
waiver policy, including promoting truth-seeking, encouraging settle-
ments, and increasing self-policing, but the court noted several oppos-
ing policy concerns as well.'" Like the First Circuit, the Columbia court
noted the difficulty of line-drawing in these situations, the concern that
encouraging disclosure to the government is not the main purpose of
the attorney-client privilege, and the idea that the privilege is not
meant to serve as a tactical tool for lawyers. 121 The court also criticized
the use of confidentiality agreements, stating that the government has
other ways to obtain the information it needs without requiring volun-
tary disclosure of privileged documents and using confidentiality
agreements to unfairly close off that information to private litigants.' 22
The court recognized that requiring the government to obtain infor-
mation without privilege waivers would be more costly, but held that
cost did not justify acceptance of selective waiver.'"
115 Id. at 292.
116
 Id. at 293.
117
 Id. at 302.
118 Id.; see Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686; Westinghouse,  951 F.2d at 1426; Permian,
665 F.2d at 1220-21.
119 Columbia, 293 F.3d at 302.
12° Id. at 303.
121 Id. at 302-03.
122 Id. at 303.
123 Id.
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5. The Tenth Circuit
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit declined to accept the doctrine of
selective waiver in the 2006 case of In re Qwest Communications Interna-
tional Inc. 124 Qwest had produced thousands of documents to the DOJ
and the SEC pursuant to subpoenas and written confidentiality agree-
ments. 125 Following these disclosures, plaintiffs in a private civil suit
sought the disclosed documents in discovery, and Qwest attempted to
assert attorney-client and work product privileges as to the docu-
ments. 126 The Tenth Circuit, however, ruled that the privilege had been
waived and declined to adopt the selective waiver doctrine. 127
The court reasoned that recognition of selective waiver, at least
on the record presented in the case, was not needed to guarantee or
encourage cooperation with law enforcement, to further the underly-
ing purposes of the privilege, or to avoid unfairness. 128 The court re-
peatedly emphasized that Qwest cooperated voluntarily and disclosed
the documents despite the fact that only one federal appellate court
had accepted selective waiver and there was no favorable Tenth Cir-
cuit precedent. 125 The court also focused on the possible negative ef-
fects of adopting selective waiver, including the idea that selective
waiver could discourage employees from communicating with corpo-
rate counsel and motivate corporate counsel to complete internal in-
vestigations "with an eye toward pleasing the government." 190
Qwest, the corporation under investigation, advanced a fairness
argument, arguing that selective waiver would avoid unfairness both
to Qwest and to the plaintiffs. 1 " If selective waiver were recognized,
Qwest argued, plaintiffs would be in no worse position than if the
company had never waived the privilege at all. 1 " The Tenth Circuit
reasoned, like the D.C. Circuit in Permian, that it would be unfair to
permit Qwest to "choose who among its opponents would be privy to
124 450 F.3d at 1181.
125 Id. The court in Qwest held that the confidentiality agreements did not support the
corporation's selective waiver argument because the agreements did very little to protect
the privacy of the documents, for example, permitting the DOJ to use the documents "in
any lawful manner in furtherance of its investigation." Id. at 1194.
126
 Id. at 1182.
'" Id. at 1192.
1" Id.
129 West, 450 F.3d at 1193, 1196.
1" Id. at 1195.
151 Id.
152 See id.
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the [documents]." 133
 The court held that it would be unfair to confer
this benefit on the corporation, especially considering that the corpo-
ration made the disclosure in the face of a great deal of negative case
law and no Tenth Circuit precedent.'"
The court discussed amicus briefs filed by the Association of Cor-
porate Counsel and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America and addressed the amici's assertions that corporations are
currently faced with a "culture of waiver." 135
 The court did not deny
the assertions made in the amicus briefs, but held that the record be-
fore the court did not present evidence of the evils of the "culture of
waiver" that would be strong enough to justify acceptance of selective
waiver. 136
 Significantly, the court noted recent legal developments in-
cluding legislative and rule-making processes intended to deal with
selective waiver and suggested that the selective waiver issue might
best be resolved via statute or rute. 137
C. The Second Circuit's Incomplete Rejection of Selective Waiver
The Second Circuit, in the 1993 case of In re Steinhardt Partners,
declined to follow the Eighth Circuit completely, but also refused to
hold that all voluntary disclosures to the government constitute a per se
waiver of the work product privilege. 138
 Although this case dealt solely
with work product privilege and not the attorney-client privilege, the
court analyzed the selective waiver issue in the same manner as in the
attorney-client privilege context, stating that "much of the reasoning in
Diversified has equal, if not greater, applicability in the context of the
work product doctrine." 39
 In this case, the SEC had begun to investi-
gate Steinhardt Partners ("Steinhardt") and was deciding whether or
not to bring enforcement proceedings against the organization.m After
1113 Id. at 1196; see also Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
154
 Quest, 450 F.3(1 at 1196.
133
 Id. at 1199.
136 Id.
137
 Id. at 1200-01; see also infra notes 159-161 (discussing proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 502(c)) and notes 211-222 (discussing the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection
Act).
nil In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993). The work product
privilege differs from the attorney-client privilege in that it protects the attorney's written
work product, whereas the attorney-client privilege protects written and verbal communi-
cations between attorneys and clients. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (dis-
cussing the scope and importance of work product privilege).
1 " Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235.
140 Id. at 232.
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discussions with SEC officials, Steinhardt's attorneys prepared a memo-
randum summarizing the facts and legal issues of the case and dis-
closed the report to the SEC."' Subsequently, private litigants brought
suit against Steinhardt and requested release of the memorandum. t42
Steinhardt refused to produce the document, claiming that the work
product privilege protected it from discovery. 143
The court rejected Steinhardt's selective waiver argument, pri-
marily based on the reasoning that courts should not permit attorneys
to utilize the privilege tactically as "another brush on an attorney's
palette," echoing the rationale of the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Per-
mian.'" Like the First Circuit, the Second Circuit in Steinhardt noted
that voluntary disclosures are made pursuant to incentives that or-
ganizations can choose to accept or reject. 145
Steinhardt, just like MIT in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, un-
successfully argued that its initial disclosure was not truly voluntary. 146
Specifically, Steinhardt asserted that to deny selective waiver causes
many corporations to face an impossible choice between denying the
benefits of cooperation with the government and exposing the corpo-
ration to civil litigation. 147 The Second Circuit recognized that corpora-
tions are faced with "difficult choices," but the court did not find this
fact to be outcome-determinative in this case. 148 Although the Second
Circuit did not assert outright that the argument for selective waiver
could be persuasive in a different factual situation, it is possible to infer
this from subsequent language in the opinion.'" In the very next sen-
tence, the court stated that decisions in cases such as this should be
made on a case-by-case basis rather than with a per se rule that volun-
tary disclosures to the government always waive the work product privi-
lege.'"
Although the Steinhardt decision addresses the work product
privilege, it is significant because, unlike the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Diversified, it was made in the face of a great deal of negative au-
thority .from other circuit courts that had rejected selective waiver
141 Id.
142 Id.
1.13 Id.
144 Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235; see Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
145 Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235-36; see Mass. hut. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686.
146 ,Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236; see Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686.
147 Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236.
148 Id.
149 See id.
15° Id.
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outright. 151
 The Eighth Circuit's decision in Diversified was one of the
first circuit court decisions to address selective waiver, while the sub-
sequent circuit court decisions in Permian, Westinghouse, and Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology were able to turn to other courts for guid-
ance on the issue. 152
Perhaps even more significantly, the Second Circuit in Steinhardt
cited Upjohn for the proposition that the issue of attorney-client privi-
lege in the context of governmental investigations should be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis)" This highlights the continuing tension, evi-
dent in other circuit court decisions, between broad rules having great
certainty and careful case-by-case analysis. 154
 Although each of the cir-
cuits that have addressed the question of selective waiver has examined
the issue in the context of the facts of each case, cases such as Westing-
house and Massachusetts Institute of Technology demonstrate that the courts
have taken a broader exclusionary approach in dealing with issues of
governmental investigations and the attorney-client privilege.' 55 The
courts in both Westinghouse and Massachusetts Institute of Technology de-
clined to address fully the circumstances of the disclosing corporations
that prompted their waiver, refusing to credit the fact that the disclo-
sures were not entirely voluntary but were compelled by external cir-
cumstances. 156 In Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the court declined
to weigh the importance of MIT's need to disclose in order to preserve
its position as a government contractor, and, in Westinghouse, the court
deemphasized the corporation's need to disclose in order to comply
with a grand jury subpoena.' 57 Thus, although Upjohn and Steinhardt
stand for the broader position that privilege issues should be decided
on a case-by-case basis, Westinghouse and Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy reflect a more categorical approach)"
151
 See id. at 236; see aLsa Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21;
Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611. Compare this to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Qtve.st, where the
court criticized the corporation's reliance on a selective waiver argument because of the
"almost unanimous circuit court rejection of selective waiver." 450 F.3d at 1193.
152 See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423-25; Permian,
665 F.2d at 1220-21; Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
153 Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236; see Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
154
 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396-97; Mass. hest. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686; Steinhardt, 9 F.3(1
at 236; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21.
155 See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427 n.15.
156
 See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427 it.15.
157
 See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427 n.15.
153
 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686; Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at
236; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427 n.15.
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D. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502(c): Acceptance of
Selective Waiver via Rule
In April 2006, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules ap-
proved an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would
formally approve selective waiver. 159 The proposed rule, Rule 502(c),
was published for comment in August 2006 with comments due by Feb-
ruary 15, 2007. 160 The rule would provide:
In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communica-
tion or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or
work product protection—when made to a federal public of
fice or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or
enforcement authority—does not operate as a waiver of the
privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental persons
or entities. 161
Although Rule 502(c) would provide that waiver of the privilege to a
government agency would not operate as waiver to a nongovernmental
entity, it provides no guidance on whether waiver as to one government
agency would constitute waiver as to another government agency. 162
Thus, Rule 502(c) would address most factual situations where selective
waiver is at issue, but it would not cover cases such as Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, where the First Circuit construed waiver as to a Depart-
ment of Defense agency to constitute waiver as to the Internal Revenue
Service, or Permian, where waiver as to the SEC amounted to waiver as to
the Department of Energy. 163 Nonetheless, if Rule 502(c) had been in
effect at the time the cases of Diversified, Westinghouse, Columbia, Steinhanit,
or Qwest had been decided, it would have changed the result in those
cases. 164 In all five of those cases, disclosure was made as to government
159 Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 6, at. 3. In April 2006, a "Mini-
Conference" on waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine was held
at Fordham University before the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. See Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules: Hearing on Proposal 502, at Fordham University School of
LaW (Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Transcript of Mini-Conference], available at http://www.
lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/EV_Hearing_April_2006.pdf.
160 Federal Rulemaking: Rules Published for Comment, http://wwwuscourts.gov/rules/
newrulesl.litml (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
161 Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 5-6 (providing the full text of
proposed Rule 502(c)).
162 Set id .
163 See id.; see also Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F3d at 683; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217.
164 See Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 5-6 (providing the full text of
proposed Rule 502(c)); see also Quest, 450 F.3d at 1182; Columbia, 293 F.3d at 293; Steinhardt, 9
F.3d at 232; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1420; Diversified 572 F.2d at 606.
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entities, and the corporations sought to protect disclosure as to nongov-
ernmental civil litigants. 165
In its report recommending submission for public comment, the
Advisory Committee noted that it has not yet taken a position on the
merits of the selective waiver portion of proposed Rule 502, and that
public comment will be particularly important in determining whether
subsection (c) to Rule 502 will be passed.' After the comment period
ending in February 2007, the rule will return to the Advisory Commit-
tee and will need to obtain approval from the Standing Committee, the
Judicial Conference, and the U.S. Supreme Court. 167
 After adoption by
the Supreme Court, the rule would become effective either when Con-
gress acts to adopt the rule or, as a matter of law, seven months after the
Court's approval. 168
 If adopted as drafted, the rule would resolve the
circuit split in favor of the Eighth Circuit, although the issue of how
waiver as to one government agency impacts waiver as to another would
remain unaddressed. 169
III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S APPROACH
TO PRIVILEGE WAIVERS
There are significant benefits to a corporation that flow from
waiver of the attorney-client privilege both under the current federal
Sentencing Guidelines and DOJ policy."° The current federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines strongly reward cooperation with the government in
corporate criminal investigations by reducing fines and penalties."
Until December 2006, DOJ policy explicitly stated that requests for
waivers of the attorney-client privilege in governmental investigations
are a legitimate prosecutorial tool and may be necessary to establish
that the organization has cooperated fully for purposes of the Guide-
165
 See Qwest, 450 F.3(1 at 1182; Columbia, 293 F.3d at 293; Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 232; West-
inghouse, 951 F.2d at 1420; Diversified, 572 F.2d at 606.
166
 Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6.
167
 See generally Duff, supra note 57 (detailing the process and procedures of federal
rulemaking).
168 See id.
169
 SeeAdvisory Committee Memorandum, supra note Ii, at 5-6 (providing the full text
of proposed Rule 502(c)),
179 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2006); McNulty Memorandum,
supra note 6, § VII.
171 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GuinmiNEs MANUAL, ch. 8.
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lines. 172 The DOJ changed its waiver request policy in December 2006
to create more standards and formalities for privilege waiver requests,
but the policy still provides that a prosecutor may consider favorably a
corporation's willingness to waive the privilege under certain circum-
stances.'" This is significant for corporations because, outside of the
Eighth Circuit, complying with a prosecutor's request for waiver as to
the government also results in waiver of the privilege as to all potential
civil litigants. 174
A. Punishment of Corporations Under the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines
The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines provide
particularly compelling incentives for organizations to cooperate with
government investigations.'" Because criminally culpable organizations
cannot be punished in the same ways that individuals can be punished
(in other words, there is no way to incarcerate a corporation), a pri-
mary form of deterrence and punishment for corporations is the impo-
sition of fines. 176 The Guidelines establish a method for determining
how much a culpable organization should pay.'" The structure of these
Guidelines provides the foundation for much criticism; thus, a brief
overview of how the Guidelines are used to calculate fines is neces-
sary. 178
First, the base fine is set based on the offense level under the
Guidelines or, if it can be calculated, the pecuniary gain to the organi-
zation because of the offense or the pecuniary loss that was caused by
the organization either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.' 79 The
172 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 7, § VI; Holder Memorandum, supra note
7, § VI.
1 " McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, §
'71 See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct 584 (2006); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 303 (6th Cir.
2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997); see also supra
notes 54-158 and accompanying text.
1" See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 8, introductory ant Effective in 1991,
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines are contained in Chapter Eight of the Commis-
sion's Guidelines Manual. Id.
1 " See generally id. ch. 8.
' 71 Id. § 8C1.1.
172 See id. ch. 8. For examples of criticism of the Guidelines, see Hasnas, supra note 9, at
619-31, and Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 50, at 153-56. For an opposing view supporting
the Guidelines, see Buchanan, supra note 52, at 587-611.
' 79 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4 (2006). Section 8C2.3 directs that the
"offense level" that determines the base fine be determined in a special way for certain of-
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court then determines the corporation's culpability score based on fac-
tors such as high-level employee involvement in or tolerance of crimi-
nal activity, the corporation's prior history of illegal activity, violations
of orders such as probation or judicial injunctions, obstruction of jus-
tice, the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program, and,
perhaps the most subjective and significant factor, "self-reporting, co-
operation, and acceptance of responsibility."18°
These factors are given point values, and the method of calcula-
tion is provided in the Guidelines at section 8C2.5. 181 The culpability
score then corresponds to a minimum multiplier and a maximum mul-
tiplier, which are multiplied by the base fine amount to provide the
minimum and maximum amounts for the range of fines within which
the court will sentence the corporation. 182 After this range is deter-
mined, the Guidelines set forth a number of factors to be considered in
determining the applicable fine from within the range, including prior
misconduct by the organization, extremely high or low culpability
scores, and the existence of an effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram at the time of the offense. 183
The Guidelines allow subtraction of 5 points from an organization's
culpability score if the organization reports an offense to the govern-
ment, "fully cooperates" with an investigation, and "clearly demonstrates"
recognition and acceptance of responsibility. 184 Significantly, these activi-
ties must take place before there is an "imminent threat of disclosure or
government investigation" and "within a reasonably prompt time" after
learning about the offense. 185 The Guidelines allow subtraction of 2
points for full cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, and they
permit deduction of 1 point for acceptance of responsibility alone. 186
These deductions are particularly significant because a difference
of 5 points in a culpability score can mean a great clea1. 187 For example,
a corporation receiving a culpability score of 5 can have the base fine
amount multiplied by a minimum of 1.00 (this would not change the
lenses that are designated in Chapter Two of the Sentencing Guidelines, and directs corpora-
tions with multiple offenses to calculate a combined offense level as provided in Chapter
Three. Id. § 8C2.3.
014
 Id. § 8C2.5.
LSI Id,
182 Id. §§ 8C2.6-8C2.7.
L" Id. §8C2.8.
184 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (g) (1).
IRS Id,
186 ld. § 8C2.5(g) (2)—(3).
187
 Id. §8C2.6.
20071	 Upjohn & Selective Waiver of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege	 525
amount of the base fine), while a culpability score of 1 carries a mini-
mum multiplier of .20, and a culpability score of 10 carries a minimum
multiplier of 2.00 (the base fine amount would be doubled) . 188 In prac-
tice, this means that a corporation receiving a culpability score of 10
could pay double the amount that a corporation with a culpability score
of 5 would be required to pay. 189
Although the Guidelines clearly reward cooperation, the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission recently amended them to state that they are not
intended to encourage waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 19° On
November 1, 2006, the following language regarding waiver of the at-
torney-client privilege was deleted from commentary to section 8C2.5:
'Waiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is
not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability score ... unless such
waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure
of all pertinent information known to the organization." 191 Although
the language of the Guidelines no longer affirmatively supports the use
of privilege waiver requests as a prerequisite to cooperation, the Guide-
lines leave open the question of whether waiver of the attorney-client
privilege should still be considered a factor in evaluating a corpora-
tion's cooperation. 192
B. Department offustice Policy: The Holder, Thompson, and McNulty
Memoranda
The Guidelines leave at least one major issue unresolved: what de-
termines full cooperation? 193 The DOJ's Office of the Deputy Attorney
General has published three memoranda that shed light on the mean-
ing of cooperation and some of the general principles that the D0.1
follows when prosecuting business organizations. 194
The first memorandum (the "Holder memo") was sent by Deputy
Attorney General Eric Holder to all Department Component Heads and
U.S. Attorneys in June 1999. 195 The Holder memo affirmed the DOrs
commitment to prosecuting corporate criminal activity and included a
IN 1d.
tag See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 8C2.5 (2006).
19° See id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 12; see also id. app. C, pt. 695.
191 See id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 12; see also id. app. C, pt. 695.
192
 See id. § 8C2.5.
155
	 id.
194 See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, at intro.; Thompson Memorandum, supra
note 7, at intro.; Holder Memorandum, supra note 7, at intro.
195 Holder Memorandum, supra note 7, at intro.
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document called "Federal Prosecution of Corporations," outlining fac-
tors and considerations to be taken into account when charging corpo-
rations. 196
 The second memorandum (the 'Thompson memo") was sent
by Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson in January 2003 and in-
cluded much of the same text from the Holder memo)" The Thomp-
son memo revised the Holder memo to reflect findings of the Corpo-
rate Fraud Task Force. 198
The Thompson and Holder memoranda stated explicitly that a
corporation's willingness to waive the attorney-client and work product
privileges should be considered in determining whether a corporation
has cooperated adequately with the government.'" Responding to
"concern that our [DOJ] practices may be discouraging full and candid
communications between corporate employees and legal counsel,"
Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty issued a superseding memo-
randum (the "McNulty memo") on December 12, 2006. 200
 The McNulty
memo provides standards and procedures to guide federal prosecutors
when they request disclosure of privileged information. 2° 1
Under the McNulty memo, prosecutors may request privileged in-
formation only when there is a legitimate law enforcement need for the
information and, if waiver is sought, prosecutors must seek the least in-
trusive waiver necessary and must obtain written authorization for the
request from upper-level DOJ supervisors. 2°2
 Information is divided into
"Category I" (purely factual information) and "Category II" (attorney-
client communications or nonfactual attorney work product). 203
 Prose-
cutors are permitted to consider a corporation's response to a request
for waiver as to Category I information in determining whether a corpo-
ration has cooperated with the government. 204
 Although prosecutors
may consider privilege waivers as to Category II information favorably,
they must not weigh the refusal to waive as to Category II information
negatively against the corporation in any charging decision. 205
196 Id. §
197
 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 7, at intro.
198 Id.
199 Id. § VI; Holder Memorandum, supra note 7, § VI.
2" McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, at intro.
201
 Id. §
202 Id.
20'3
204 Id.
205 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § VII.
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The recent changes in both the Guidelines and DOJ policy reflect
an attempt to downplay the need for privilege waivers." 6 In addition,
some commentators have suggested that privilege waivers create fewer
problems than one might think because they are rarely utilized. 2D7 De-
spite this claim, the issue of privilege waivers has proved significant
enough to merit attention from seven circuit courts, the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the
DOJ, and even Congress. 2" And, despite recent cutbacks that have sof-
tened the harshness of DOJ policy with the McNulty memo and the de-
letion of some commentary from the Guidelines, neither the Sentenc-
ing Commission nor the DOJ has fully precluded the use of privilege
waivers as a means to cooperate with the government. 2"
C. Proposed Legislation: The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007
On January 4, 2007, Senator Arlen Specter reintroduced legislation
in the Senate called the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007
(the "ACPPA"). 21° The ACPPA would prohibit federal prosecutors from
requesting disclosure of privileged information and using assertion of
the attorney-client privilege as a factor in determining whether a corpo-
ration has cooperated with the government. 2" If enacted, this legisla-
tion would alleviate significantly the pressure to waive the attorney-client
privilege that DOJ policy and the Sentencing Guidelines have placed on
corporations.212 Support for the ACPPA has come from the ACLU, the
Association of Corporate Counsel, and ABA President Karen Mathis. 213
2°6 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2006); McNulty Memorandum,
supra note 6, § VII.
2°7 See. Buchanan, supra note 52, at 598 (asserting that waiver requests are the excep-
tion, rather than the rule, in prosecution of corporations).
2°8 See Quest, 450 F.3d at 1187-88 (discussing the treatment of selective waiver by vari-
ous circuit courts); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong.
§ 3 (2007); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 8; Advisory Committee Memoran-
dum, supra note 6, at 3; McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § VII.
2°9 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 cmt. 12; McNulty Memorandum,
supra note 6, § VII.
2111 S. 186.
211 Id .
Johnson, Higher Hurdles Set in Corporate Crime Cases: Business Pressure Spurs Change, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 2006, at DI.
212 See S. 186, § 3; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2006); McNulty
Memorandum, supra note 6, § VII.
2I9
	 Bar Assoc., Statement by ABA President Karen J. Mathis Regarding Revisions to
the Justice Department's Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.
abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=59; Press Release, Am. Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Welcomes Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act: 13111 Would Safe-
§ 3. The legislation was originally introduced on December 7, 2006. See Carrie
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The ACPPA provides maximum protection for corporations seek-
ing to assert the attorney-client privilege in a government investiga-
tion. 214
 It would create a bright-line rule whereby prosecutors could
never consider willingness to waive the privilege either in making a
charging decision or in determining cooperation. 215 The enactment
and codification of the ACPPA would do little to encourage coopera-
tion and voluntary disclosure, however, and thus might not be in the
best interests of federal prosecutors. 216
 Cooperation and voluntary dis-
closures are important law enforcement tools that make government
investigations more efficient and less costly. 217
The enactment of the ACPPA would not end the debate regarding
selective waiver. 218
 Unlike the ACPPA, selective waiver would encourage
the free flow of information between government investigators and
corporations because corporations would be able to disclose privileged
information to the government without risking exposure to civil litiga-
tion. 219
 The ACPPA encourages assertion of the attorney-client privi-
lege, which could prove costly for the government.220 To get to the root
of corporate wrongdoing, investigators will need to garner information
from independent sources, possibly through costly investigations or liti-
gation involving extended discovery proceedings. 221
 Selective waiver
guard Constitutional Right to Counsel (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://wwwaclu.org/
crintjustice/gen/27657prs20061207.htrn1; Press Release, Assoc. of Corporate Counsel, What
Does the DOJ's Issuance of the "McNulty Memorandum" Mean for You and Your Client (Dec.
13, 2006), available at hup://www.acc.cont/public/attyclientpriv/mcnulty-tp.pdf.
214 Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
215 Id. § 3(b) (2) .
236 See id. § 3; see also Brown, supra note 39, at 902 (emphasizing the importance of co-
operation for prosecutors in light of the time and cost involved with investigations).
2/7 See Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303 (recognizing that waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege can result in significant savings for prosecutors); Brown, supra note 39, at 902 (sug-
gesting that DOJ policy supporting privilege waivers is driven by a desire for "efficiency
and cost savings").
216 See S. 186, § 3.
212
 See, e.g., Quest, 450 F.3d at 1193 (recognizing that selective waiver encourages coop-
eration with government agencies); Claire E. Furry, Note, Permian Corporation v. United
States and the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations: Unjustified Severity on the Issue of Waiver,
77 Nw. U. L. REV. 223, 244 (1982) (arguing that courts "stifle any cooperative spirit" be-
tween corporations and government agencies when they Pail to recognize selective waiver);
Brian M. Smith, Note, Be Careful How You Use It or You May Lose It: A Modern Look at Corpo-
rate Attorney-Client Privilege and the Ease of Waiver in Various Circuits, 75 U. DET, MERCY L.
REV. 389, 408 (1998) (noting that selective waiver would improve relations and coopera-
tion between corporations and government agencies).
220 See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
221
 See Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303 (recognizing that when a corporation waives the privi-
lege, "tclonsiderable savings are realized to the government, and through it to the public,
in time and fiscal expenditure related to the investigation of crimes and civil fraud");
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would allow a corporation to cooperate with the government with lim-
ited risk and exposure, thus raising the incentive for corporations to
disclose information voluntarily to the government without having to
engage in expensive and protracted litigation. 222
In summary, the current state of the Sentencing Guidelines, DOJ
memoranda, and the significant discretion granted to prosecutors pro-
vide strong incentives for corporations to cooperate by waiving the at-
torney-client privilege when the government requests a privilege
waiver.223 Recognizing selective waiver of the privilege in situations
where a government prosecutor requests a waiver from a corporation
could serve to diminish the harsh consequences of compliance with a
waiver request. 224 If the ACPPA is passed as drafted, it will alleviate pres-
sure to waive from the DOJ and the Guidelines, but recognition of se-
lective waiver is the only surefire way to encourage full cooperation and
true dialogue between government investigators and corporations. 225
IV. PRINCIPLES FROM UPJOHN APPLIED TO THE
SELECTIVE WAIVER DEBATE
The principles that the U.S. Supreme Court valued in Upjohn Co. v.
United States of predictability, protection of information flowing to the
attorney in internal investigations, and respect for the role of the attor-
ney as an investigator should be extended to the debate over selective
waiver. 226 These principles arc relevant in the selective waiver context
because Upjohn is the most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision to
speak directly on policy issues surrounding the corporate attorney-
client privilege.227 The Court has reaffirmed the validity of Upjohn, most
recently in the 1996 case of Jaffee v. Redmond, where the Court cited Up-
john for the principle that an asserted privilege must serve public
Brown, supra note 39, at 902 (suggesting that 1303 policy supporting privilege waivers is
driven by a desire for "efficiency and cost savings").
222 see, e.g., Transcript of Mini-Conference, supra note 159, at 28 (testimony of James
Robinson, Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP) (discussing how selective waiver
is "mutually beneficial" to both government and corporations).
223 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2006); McNulty Memorandum,
supra note 6, § VII.
224 See Finder, supra note 50, at 124 (discussing the benefits of selective waiver).
22,5
 see S. 186, § 3.
226 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-96 (1981).
227 See id. Since Upjohn, the Court has addressed the scope of the corporate attorney-
client privilege only once. See Commodity Futures Trading COMM . 11 v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343, 354 (1985). In Commodity Futures Trading Commission u Weintraub, the Court held that a
trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy could waive the corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege, because the trustee acted as the manager of the corporation. Id.
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ends. 228
 In Jaffee, the Court utilized this principle from Upjohn to justify
recognition of a new privilege between psychotherapists and patients. 229
Similarly, as the debate over selective waiver intensifies in response to
the new McNulty memo, proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502(c),
and the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, courts should
return to the principles in Upjohn to shape future decisions about the
attorney-client privilege, including recognition of the selective waiver
doctrine.230
A. Predictability
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court rejected the control group test be-
cause it created confusion for attorneys regarding what communica-
tions would be protected.m As recognized in Upjohn, certainty about
how the attorney-client privilege applies to communications is an im-
portant value for courts to preserve. 232
 Selective waiver would increase
predictability fbr corporate attorneys because it informs the attorney
conducting an internal investigation that even though a prosecutor's
privilege waiver request might require waiver as to the government, out-
side third parties will not be able to access the otherwise privileged in-
formation.238
Internal investigations often require attorneys to interview numer-
ous employees and seek sensitive information, and attorneys want to be
able to predict whether the information obtained could possibly be ex-
posed to nongovernmental potential civil litigants.284 Because the gov-
ernment has a great deal of discretion over whether or not a corpora-
tion will be prosecuted and how harshly it may be prosecuted for a
given ofTense, corporate attorneys may not be able to predict whether
the government will get involved and if the prosecutor will request a
228
 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996).
229 Id.
23° See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-93; Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S.
186, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007); McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § VII.
281 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
232
 See id.
2" See, e.g., Smith, supra note 219, at 409 (noting that the limited waiver theory in Diversi-
fied furthers the same predictability goal encouraged in Upjohn); Raymond E. Watts, Jr.,
Comment, Reconciling Voluntary Disclosure with the Atturney-COrporate Client Privilege: A Move
Toward a Comprehensivel invited Waiver Doctrine, 39 MERCER L. REV. 1341, 1348 (1988) (same).
254 See Hasnas, supra note 9, at 649 (describing the difficulty of dealing with employees
when Faced with a probable privilege waiver request).
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waiver of privilege. 236 If selective waiver of the privilege were recog-
nized, however, corporate attorneys would be able both to cooperate
with the government and better predict the level of exposure resulting
from disclosure.236 Currently, as soon as the government requests a
privilege waiver, the documents that the corporation is compelled to
disclose are available to any number of potential civil plaintiffs.237 Thus,
if corporations are permitted to waive the privilege only as to the gov-
ernment, they may have more of an incentive to cooperate with the
government and may be more willing to engage in self-policing via in-
ternal investigations, because the consequences of such investigations
will be limited to action by the government. 238
Admittedly, the bright-line approach taken by several circuit courts
also serves predictability in that it excludes any communication from
protection of the attorney-client privilege if it has been disclosed to the
government. 239 This type of categorical exclusion, however, is contrary
to the Court's requirement of case-by-case analysis in Upjohn.240 The
Upjohn decision clearly implicates the need for some line drawing, be-
cause the Court requires that issues regarding the application of the
attorney-client privilege be considered on a case-by-case basis, as recog-
nized in In re Steinhardt Partners."' The Supreme Court also recognized
that the Federal Rules of Evidence require courts to consider these is-
233 See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, §111.13 (providing factors for prosecutors
to consider in making charging decisions but recognizing that "prosecutors must exercise
their judgment in applying and balancing these factors and this process does not mandate
a particular result"); see also Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 50, at 157-58 (discussing the
wide discretion given to federal prosecutors).
255 See Finder, supra note 50, at 124-25 (exploring the positive benefits of selective
waiver whereby corporations can maintain confidentiality while still cooperating with the
government); see also Transcript of Mini-Conference, supra note 159, at 28.
2" See In re Qwest Cornmc'ns Intl Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. de-
nied, 127 S. Ct. 584 (2006) (holding that disclosure of documents to DOJ and the SEC
constituted waiver as to private litigants, despite the existence of a confidentiality agree-
ment); In re Columbia/I-1CA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 303 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
disclosure of audit documents to the DOJ resulted in a release of the documents to private
litigants, despite the existence of a confidentiality agreement); In re Steinhardt Partners,
L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2(1 Cir. 1993) (holding that release of a memorandum to the DOJ
resulted in release of the memorandum to private litigants).
2s8 See Waldman, supra note 26, at 492 (explaining the Upjohn Court's underlying as-
sumption that free-flowing communication results in increased voluntary legal compli-
ance).
239 See, e.g., Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303-04; United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d
681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997).
249 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
241 See id.; Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236.
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sues on a case-by-case basis, even though this practice precludes an easy
bright-line approach to attorney-client privilege issues. 242
In addition, a bright-line approach serves to discourage coopera-
tion with the government, thus failing to promote the public interest in
efficient prosecutions of corporations through cooperative efforts. 243
 Se-
lective waiver provides a more favorable type of predictability because it
encourages governmental cooperation and allows corporations to be
more certain about the impact of disclosure in terms of private litiga-
tion. 244
 With selective waiver, corporate attorneys are permitted to make
more informed choices about how to conduct internal investigations. 245
B. Protection of Information Flowing from Client to Attorney
The Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn reflects a judgment that
information an attorney obtains in furtherance of an internal investiga-
tion should be protected by the attorney-client privilege, in addition to
the legal advice flowing from the attorney to the corporation. 246 The
purpose of the attorney-client privilege, as asserted in Upjohn, is to pro-
mote compliance with the law by permitting the free flow of communi-
cation. 247
 For an attorney to convey the advice necessary to ensure that
corporations are complying with the law, the attorney must first have all
possible information and facts from the client. 248
 Because the control
group test discouraged communication between attorneys and lower-
level employees, the Court held that the test was contrary to the pur-
242 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396-97. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
issues of privilege are governed by the common law, not by statute. FED. R. Evil). 501. For
further discussion about the rationale behind Rule 501 and the need for a case-by-case
evaluation to determine how a privilege applies in a given situation, see S. REP. No. 93-
1277 (1974).
2" See Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 389 (holding that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege
is to encourage communication and "thereby promote broader public interests in the ob-
servance of law and administration ofjustice"); see also Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1193 (recognizing
that acceptance of the selective waiver doctrine could increase cooperation with govern-
ment agencies).
244
 See Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303; Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236. In both Columbia and
Steinhardt, corporations could have avoided disclosure of otherwise privileged documents
to private civil litigants if the courts had chosen to recognize selective waiver. See Columbia,
293 F.3d at 303; Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236.
245 See Hasnas, supra note 9, at 648-50 (discussing the implications of uncertainty in
the context of employees who are interviewed in an internal investigation).
248
	 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 389 (stating that the attorney-client privilege 'recognizes that sound legal ad-
vice or advocacy serves public ends, and that such advocacy depends on the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client").
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pose of the privilege. 249 Therefore, it is clear from the Upjohn decision
that the attorney-client privilege should be interpreted in a way that
promotes and protects communication from clients to attorneyoso
Recognizing the selective waiver doctrine would promote and pro-
tect the flow of information from employees to corporate counsel in
internal investigations because efforts to maintain legal compliance
would no longer put the corporation at risk of private third-party litiga-
tion.25 ' Currently, outside of the Eighth Circuit, all information that
corporate attorneys collect for purposes of internal investigations is at
risk for disclosure to third parties because any waiver as to the govern-
ment constitutes a waiver as to all parties, and corporations are often left
with little choice but to comply when the government requests a waiver
of the privilege. 252 If corporations are permitted to cooperate with gov-
ernmental investigations by selectively waiving the privilege, they will
have a greater incentive to encourage frank communication between
employees and attorneys, because the fruits of internal investigations
will be less likely to haunt the corporation in subsequent civil litiga-
tion. 253
At least one court, however, has countered this hypothesis by hold-
ing that recognition of the selective waiver doctrine may actually inhibit,
rather than promote, the flow of information from corporate employees
to corporate counse1.254 In the 2006 case of In re Qwest Communications
International Inc., the Tenth Circuit stated that officers and employees
might. be less forthcoming with information if they knew that the em-
ployer could disclose the privileged information to the government
249
 Id. at 392.
250 Id.
251 See Columbia, 293 F.3d at 291-93. The facts of Columbia provide an example of how
disclosure to the government can result in waiver of the privilege as to civil litigants. See id.;
see also supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
252 see Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F2d 596,611 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc); see
also Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951
F.2d 1414,1425 (3d Cir. 1991); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214,1220 (D.C. Cir.
1981). For additional discussion, see supra notes 170-225 and accompanying text.
293 See Brown, supra note 39, at 903 (noting that "lblefore the advent of compelled-
voluntary waiver, there was arguably a greater probability that counsel would receive all
pertinent information, both good and bad, and would accordingly have the opportunity to
steer the company in a lawful direction"); Janet L. Hall, "Limited Waiver" of Protection Af-
forded by the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, 1993 U. Ii.t. L. Ray. 981,
995-96 (suggesting that limited waiver may increase compliance with laws and regula-
tions); Hasnas, supra note 9, at 648-50 (discussing the impact of current white collar crime
provisions on internal investigations and the trust among employers, employees, and at-
torneys).
254 Quest, 450 F.3d at 1195.
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without risking a broader waiver of privilege. 255
 It is speculative to con-
sider just how often officers and employees will engage in this sort of
analysis before cooperating with corporate counsel, and it is perhaps
unfortunate that the officers and employees providing information in
an investigation have little power over the decision as to whether the
privilege should be waived.256
 Even if the Tenth Circuit is correct in
pointing out that selective waiver might not encourage officers and em-
ployees to be forthcoming with corporate counsel, the selective waiver
doctrine does promote internal investigations—it removes the disincen-
tive for corporations to collect information and provides some addi-
tional protection against disclosure to private litigants. 257
C. Competing Incentives and a Utilitarian Approach to the
Attorney-Client Privilege
The Supreme Court's opinion in Upjohn also reflects a strongly
utilitarian view of the corporate attorney-client privilege because the
Court chose to reject the theoretically sound but impractical control
group test in favor of a test that takes incentives and practicality into
account.258 In Upjohn, the Court held that the control group theory's
limited view of what it means to be a "client" did not fully protect the
information flowing to the lawyer in the course of internal investiga-
tions, and that such protection is necessary to ensure that clients are
actually receiving adequate legal advice. 259
 Accordingly, the Upjohn test
accounts for the reality that attorneys must obtain information from
lower-level employees to assist the corporation in maintaining legal
compliance.260
 Similarly, although the concept of selective waiver may
not appear to advance the theoretical purpose of the attorney-client
privilege directly, acceptance of the doctrine of selective waiver may be
255 Id.
255 See Brown, supra note 39, at 903 (noting that there is "room for doubt" as to
whether the threat of privilege waivers actually impacts corporate attorney-client relation-
ships); Buchanan, supra note 52, at 599 (stating that when corporations have compliance
programs, lel mployees should not have false expectations concerning the confidentiality
of their conummications with corporate counsel").
257 See West, 450 F.3d at 1195; see also Transcript of Mini-Conference, supra note 159, at
58 (discussing whether selective waiver creates a disincentive for cooperation with corpo-
rate investigations).
258 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392; Di Grazio, supra note 48, at 570 (referring to the ap-
proach taken by the Court in Upjohn as a "functionalist" approach); see also Waldman, supra
note 26, at 481 n.39 (citing Upjohn as an example of judicial reliance on utilitarian reason-
ing).
259 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
26° Id. at 394-95; see also Waldman, supra note 26, at 492.
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necessary to achieve utilitarian goals of conserving resources and en-
suring that more corporations voluntarily comply with the law. 261
1. Interpreting the Privilege to Encourage Cooperation and Efficiency
Acceptance of the selective waiver doctrine serves the important
utilitarian goal of efficiency because corporations may be more willing to
waive the privilege as to the government, thereby making violations eas-
ier to prosecute. 262 By obtaining information that the corporation's own
internal investigation has already uncovered, the government is not
forced to waste its own additional resources to obtain the information on
its own.263 Several courts that have declined to recognize selective waiver
of the privilege, however, have not been persuaded by this resource-
focused argument.264 Instead of focusing on the social benefits that flow
from acceptance of the selective waiver doctrine—such as increased co-
operation with government, ease of prosecution, and incentive for self-
policing—these courts instead emphasize the more basic theoretical
purpose of the attorney-client privilege, which is to encourage commu-
nication between attorneys and clients. 266 This narrower view of the privi-
lege excludes the possibility that one of its uses could be to encourage
communication between corporations and the government. 266
2. Interpreting the Privilege to Recognize and Resolve Practical
Problems
The Supreme Court's willingness to shape interpretation of the
attorney-client privilege based on a practical recognition of competing
incentives also reflects its utilitarian approach. 267 In Upjohn, the Court
recognized that attorneys were faced with a difficult choice between
thoroughly investigating the corporation, thus risking that the privilege
would not apply to communications with non-control group employees,
251 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 253, at 996 (discussing how the limited waiver rule reduces
government costs); Waldman, supra note 26, at 492 (explaining the Upjohn Court's volun-
tary compliance model reasoning).
262 See Hall, supra note 253, at 996 (arguing that a limited waiver rule may reduce investi-
gatory costs). But see Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n.15 (stating that the privilege might have
been recognized if the corporation had fully litigated and contested a subpoena).
263 See Hall, supra note 253, at 996.
264 See, e.g., Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685.
265 See Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685; see also Westing-
house, 951 E2d at 1425; Perrnian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21.
266 See Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685; see also Westing-
house, 951 F.2d at 1425; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21.
257 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92.
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and not investigating at al1.268
 The Court rejected the control group test
in part because the test threatened to discourage corporate attorneys
not only from communicating with lower-level employees, but also from
working to keep the corporation in compliance with applicable laws by
conducting internal investigations. 269 Upjohn reflects the Court's view
that the law should not hinder corporate attorneys in their efforts to
gather information and promote legal compliance. 270
 The Upjohn
Court recognized the difficult choices facing attorneys and resolved the
conflict by formulating a new test that provides maximum incentives
for self-policing and truth-seeking while maintaining protection of the
attorney-client privilege over information collected in investigations.271
Similarly, acceptance of the doctrine of selective waiver could
eliminate a disincentive for self-policing and promote the performance
of internal investigations. 272
 Corporate attorneys currently face the
same difficult choice because, without recognition of selective waiver,
conducting an internal investigation can be risky. 275
 A mere request for
a governmental privilege waiver may result in release of sensitive in-
formation to adverse private litigants, thus exposing the corporation to
extensive liability. 274
 Because the implications of privilege waiver are so
great when selective waiver is not recognized, there is less of an incen-
tive for corporations to complete internal investigations at al1. 275
3. Interpreting the Privilege to Reflect Pragmatic Realities
Upjohn reflected a willingness to interpret the privilege in terms of
the realistic needs of corporations.276
 Although, in theory, the only in-
2" Id.
269 Id. at 392.
276
 See id.; see also Waldman, supra note 26, at 492.
271 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92.
272
 See supra notes 251-257 and accompanying text; see also Transcript of Mini-
Conference, supra note 159, at 58 (testimony of Peter B. Pope, Deputy Attorney General of
the State of New York).
277
	 e.g., Beth A. Wilkinson & Steven H. Schulman, VVhen Talk Is Not Cheap: Communica-
tions with the Media, the Government, and Other Parties in High Profile White Collar Criminal Cases,
39 Ass. CRISS. L REV. 203,216 (2002) (discussing the risks associated with communication to
the government in white collar criminal investigations); Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 50, at
156 (pointing out that waiver as to the government leads to waiver as to all parties).
274 See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 9, at 654 (opining that engaging in self-assessment is
"practically inviting litigation"); Wilkinson & Schulman, supra note 273, at 216.
275 See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 9, at 655-56 (highlighting the costs of self-assessment in
light oldie current Organizational Sentencing Guidelines).
276 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391; Di Grazio, supra note 48, at 570 (noting that, after Up-
john, "bit was no longer necessary to consider the rigid, narrow, and formalistic approach
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dividuals within a corporation who could be considered "clients" are
those with power to make legal decisions for the corporation—in other
words, those in the control group—the Court extended protection of
the privilege to communications between lower-level employees and
corporate counsel because the reality of the corporate structure re-
quired this result. 277
Because the Court in Upjohn reflected a willingness to interpret the
privilege realistically, the "fairness" concern that selective waiver permits
tactical use of the privilege should not preclude acceptance of the doc-
trine.278 Some circuit courts have rejected selective waiver on the theory
that it is "unfair" for a corporation to assert the privilege in one proceed-
ing but not in another.279 This approach ignores two important realities
of how the privilege actually works in litigation. 280 First, although the
theory of the attorney-client privilege focuses exclusively on the ability of
clients to receive accurate legal advice, assertion or waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege in litigation often reflects a tactical decision 281 For
example, some corporations may waive the privilege to the DOJ as a tac-
tic to avoid being charged, or prosecutors may request privilege waivers
as a tactic to force cooperation. Second, as recognized in the Westinghouse
case, enforcing the privilege against civil litigants after information has
previously been disclosed to the government is not necessarily unfair. 282
In reality, the private parties are not harmed by this and are no worse off
in their own litigation because of the prior disclosure. 283
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court chose to value the investigatory role
of corporate counsel by abolishing the control group test and thus
making it less difficult for counsel to conduct internal investigations. 284
taken by the court of appeals because it simply did not work in the context of the complex
dynamics of a large corporation").
277 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391.
778 See id.; see also Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 (providing background rationale for the
"fairness" critique of selective waiver); Furry, supra note 219, at 237-42 (arguing that rec-
ognition of selective waiver provides optimal fairness).
279 See, e.g., Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1196; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3(1 at 685; Permian, 665
F.2d at 1221.
no See infra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
281 See Smith, supra note 219, at 409 (discussing the inapplicability of the argument
that the privilege should not be used as both a "sword and shield," in the context of mod-
ern corporations). For more in-depth discussion of the inapplicability of the "sword and
shield" analogy in the modern context, see Furry, supra note 219, at 233-35.
282 See Westinghouse., 951 F.2d at 1426.
21" See id. at 1426 n.13; see also Hall. supra note 253, at 994-95 (arguing that it follows
from the Court's logic in Upjohn that whether a party has cooperated with the government
is not relevant in the context of claims by a third party).
284 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
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If the Court seeks to uphold the values set forth in Upjohn, it should
resolve the current circuit conflict by recognizing selective waiver of the
attorney-client privilege because selective waiver would still permit the
government to investigate wrongdoing in the most efficient way possi-
ble, while recognizing the realities of competing incentives and practi-
cal application of the privilege in the corporate context. 285
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States
resolved an important conflict in the lower courts regarding the applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege to corporate communications and,
in particular, the results of internal investigations. Currently, the circuit
courts are embroiled in another conflict regarding the application of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. The Eighth Cir-
cuit has chosen to recognize a selective waiver of the privilege whereby a
corporation may waive the attorney-client privilege selectively as to the
government alone, whereas the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits have expressly refused to recognize the concept of selective
waiver. This debate is particularly relevant in light of current Sentencing
Guidelines that strongly reward cooperation with the government, and
the DOJ's continued, albeit qualified, acceptance of compliance with
privilege waiver requests as favorable proof of cooperation with the gov-
ernment.
Most recently, concerns about erosion of the attorney-client privi-
lege have sparked both rulemaking and legislative proceedings in the
Senate and the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. The Supreme
Court's decision in Upjohn provides a strong foundation for the argu-
ment that the debate should be resolved in favor of the Eighth Circuit
and selective waiver. The goals of predictability, protection of informa-
tion gathered by attorneys, and utility guided the Upjohn Court's deci-
sion. Increased recognition of the doctrine of selective waiver would
serve these same goals.
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